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MOOT POINTS IN SOCIOLOGY.

I. THE SCOPE AND TASK OF SOCIOLOGY.

So THE subject-matter of sociology is the social aggregate! But what is meant by the social aggregate? Where does it begin, where end? Is it humanity, the race, the nation, the community, the class, or the voluntary association? "Study the social organism," they bid us, but nowhere do we perceive a social body complete in itself, with head and members, periphery and viscera. We see extending everywhere a web of human beings, woven now close, now loose; binding men together sometimes with many threads, sometimes with few; uniting them at times directly, oftener indirectly, through other men, or through centers of attachment such as common interests, ideals, or institutions. Where in this continuous tissue shall we find a social cadaver to dissect?

In another quarter it is held that sociology is concerned only with the action of human groups on one another—social phenomena—and the influence of the group on its individual members—psycho-social phenomena. According to Gumpłowicz and Bauer, not social wholes, but the hundred interlacing groups into which men combine, are the proper subject of study. This, no doubt, is an enticing conception, for it excuses us from showing how groups form and how a group-type or a group-will arises out of the play of mind on mind. It is not clear, however, that the sociologist may ignore the genesis of the group any more than the biologist may ignore the genesis of the organism. Then, too, quite aside from the group, there are man-to-man relations, which are well worth studying. How the social mystery begins to clear when we have made out such typical relations as those between model and imitator, apostle and disciple, leader and follower, or between two dissentients, two consentients, two competitors, or two persons with common interests! Yet such a couple is not a group any more than a

binary star is a solar system, or a molecule of two atoms a body.

Most helpful is Simmel's notion that the true matter of sociology is not the groups themselves, but the *modes* or *forms* of association into groups. In bodies the most diverse—a church or a guild, a trust or an art league—may be found identical modes of union. Despite their infinite variety of purpose, the groupings of men reduce to a few principles of association. Among such “forms” are equality, superiority and subordination, division of labor, imitation and opposition, secrecy, and hierarchy. To work out the various relations in which associates may stand to one another, and to discover what happens to groups in consequence of the more or less of each relation, is the task of the sociologist.

Nevertheless, I prefer to consider this attractive area, not the domain of sociology, but only one of its provinces, viz., that of *social morphology*. The partialness of a conception which focuses our gaze on the human interactions themselves is well brought out by comparing it with another conception which rivets attention on the results or products of these interactions. For Dr. Ward the subject-matter of sociology consists in *human achievement*. How do languages, sciences, and arts come into being? How does the coral reef of civilization rise? This is certainly one of the most fascinating and practical of studies, but, as Dr. Ward distinctly states, it does not cover all the ground. I should place his superb book, as (say) Vol. III, in a complete treatise on sociology. For how can you draw a firm line between those modes of human interaction which yield a permanent product, and those which leave behind them no lasting result? Mobs and panics, public opinion and social suggestion, are certainly worthy of study, albeit they contribute nothing to the sum of human achievement.

A widening circle of thinkers make sociology equivalent to *the science of association*. They would have it deal with the conditions, motives, modes, phases, and products of association, whether animal or human. Here is, indeed, a virgin field to till, and to it we all gladly retire when our neighbors stigmatize us

as poachers and claim-jumpers. But who contents himself with this territory? Professor Giddings so conceives sociology, yet he tells us a few pages farther on that it is concerned with "the constant elements in history." All sociologists are keen in their ambition to find out the springs of human progress, to lay bare the prime causes of social transformations, to trace the influence of environment on the character of population, and to correlate the various phenomena of social life. Yet none of these properly belong among the problems of association.

Social psychology, social morphology, social mechanics—all of them are, it seems to me, but convenient segments of a science, the subject-matter of which is *social phenomena*. I say "phenomena" in preference even to "activities," because it embraces beliefs and feelings as well as actions.

"But," it will be urged, "what phenomena *are* social? People yawn, sleep, mope, plan. Is this sort of thing *social* just because they are neighbors? The solitary ape behaves in the same way." This query cannot be better answered than in the words of Tarde: "What a man does without having learned from the example of another person, walking, crying, eating, mating, is purely vital; while walking with a certain step, singing a song, preferring at table one's national dishes and partaking of them in a well-bred way, courting a woman after the manner of the time, are social."

If the social is not the vital, neither is it the individual psychic. So we might add as supplement to Tarde: "When one fears the dark, delights in color, craves a mate, or draws an inference from his own observations, that is merely *psychic*. But when one dreads heresy, delights in 'good form,' craves the feminine type of his time, or embraces the dogmas of his people, that is *social*."

But we cannot go with Tarde when he says: "The social is the imitated." Psychologists recognize that one idea calls up another in virtue of contrast as well as in virtue of resemblance. Likewise a person's behavior may be determined in way of opposition as well as in way of imitation. "Contrary" children are controlled by telling them just the opposite of what you wish

them to do. Likewise non-conformists in going out of their way to flout conventions pay involuntary homage to the influence of society. Foemen, competitors, and disputants so determine one another that it is impossible to gauge them without invoking the external factor. "Social," then, are all phenomena which we cannot explain without bringing in the action of man on man.

If at first blush this calls for a "science of things human," let us remember that sociology is not bound to attend to phenomena that do not manifest themselves on a considerable scale. The individual case—David and Jonathan, Lear and his daughters—challenges only the artist. Let a case recur often enough to present a type of personal relations, let many lives receive the same standard or ideal from without, and there is room for the generalizer.

Practically one would not go far wrong in saying that *sociology deals with the development, maintenance, and disappearance of social planes, classes, and groups, and of the structures, institutions, and cultures they produce*. By *planes* I mean particular uniformities in belief and practice created by association. *Classes* are uniformities in character or mind which arise in consequence of social life. A more protracted play of the socializing forces creates *groups*, which are classes, the members of which, having become conscious of one another, draw together and so generate a group-will which reacts upon the individual wills.

In the rag-carpet times of our grandmothers each housewife got her warp from the store, but provided the woof from her own rag-bag. Now the woof of each human being's life is supplied by that which is individual to him; his heredity, temperament, situation, history. But the warp is supplied from without, sometimes from a very slender stock, allowing little range of selection. Whence and how commonplace people get the knowledge, convictions, tastes, and standards that constitute the warp of their lives is explained by *social psychology*—and although some regard it as the top story of psychology, I prefer to make it the lower story of sociology.

The running of boundary lines acceptable to the biologist and

the psychologist is not the worst of our task. There remains the harder problem of coming to terms with the special social sciences, such as economics, jurisprudence, and politics.

Sociology, as I have described it, does not meekly sidle in among the established sciences dealing with the various aspects of social life. It does not content itself with clearing and tilling some neglected tract. It has, indeed, reclaimed certain stretches of wilderness and made them its own. With this modest rôle, however, it is not satisfied. It aspires to nothing less than the suzerainty of the special social sciences. It expects them to surrender their autonomy and become dependencies, nay even provinces, of sociology. The claim is bold, and we may be sure the workers in long-cultivated fields will resist such pretensions, unless there are the best of reasons for founding a single comprehensive science of social phenomena.

Such a reason is certainly not furnished by "the unity of the social aggregate." As we have seen, there is no well-defined social aggregate. The nation is the nearest to it, but the actual distinctness and oneness of the nation is a historical incident due to past wars. Every step in the peaceful assimilation of peoples brings us nearer the time when the globe will be enmeshed in an unending plexus of interpenetrating free associations, no one of which will arrogate to itself the title of "society."

Nor is a good reason furnished by that constant reciprocal action between *socii* which is expressed in the "social organism" concept. As division of labor, exchange, and competition, these interactions have long formed part of the stock in trade of economics. As communication, they are the staple of linguistics. As party activity and civic co-operation, they have been set forth by the science of politics. Wherefore, then, a new science to teach that "no man liveth unto himself"?

Some would justify a unitary treatment of society by making one species of social phenomena the cause of all the rest. However varied the aspects of social life, if there is but one causal center, one fountain head of change, there can be but one science. To Loria's eye all the non-economic factors running through the

social system—such as law, politics, and morality—derive from underlying economic conditions. The desire for wealth is the sole architect of ethical standards, legal norms, and the constitution of the state. As Loria takes the economic régime, so Vico and Fustel de Coulanges and Mr. Kidd take religion, Condorcet, Buckle, and Du Bois Reymond take science, as the *primum mobile* of the social world. All this, however, reads into human events a unity and simplicity that is not really there. There is more than one desire operating in society. The endeavor to reduce all kinds of social facts to a single cause is vain.

An adequate ground for creating an inclusive science lies in none of the foregoing considerations. Let us, then, attack the problem from another side. Let us consider under what conditions the established social sciences might vindicate the sacredness of their ancient boundaries and successfully withstand any scheme of merger into a more general science.

Suppose that the desires that constitute the springs of human action and the causes of social phenomena resolved into certain basic cravings, each distinct from the others in its object, and each stimulating men to a particular mode of activity in order to satisfy it. Suppose, furthermore, these specific desires never crossed or modified one another and were intractable to the unifying control of any world-view or ideal of life. Suppose, finally, that each craving, or set of cravings, operating on a large scale, generated in society certain appropriate dogmas, creeds, activities, and institutions, which remained separate from and unmixed with the collective manifestations of other cravings. Religious phenomena would then be unalloyed by ethical or political considerations. The forms of the family would be unaffected by industrial changes. The fine arts would run their course heedless of revolutions in the sphere of ideas.

Under these conditions there might exist for each set of cravings at work in social life an independent body of knowledge. The craving for wealth would mark out a sphere for economics. The sex and parental cravings would do the same for genetics or the science of the family. The lust for power would define politics. The sentiment of the wronged would fix the scope of juris-

prudence. The craving for communion with the Unseen would bound the field of the science of religion. The attraction of like for like would make possible the science of association. There would be as many social sciences as there were facets to human nature, and if any bond drew them together into a larger synthesis, it would be supplied by psychology and not by a general sociology.

The mere statement of the requirements to be fulfilled in order to assure the sovereignty and equality of the special social sciences is a sufficient answer to such claims. Each is not the exclusive field of action of certain impulses. So far as specific cravings exist, they react upon and modify one another, they lie under the empery of the accepted world-view or ideal of life, they are trimmed and adjusted to fit into a plan of life. Moreover, turning from the sphere of mind to that of society, we do not find one species of activities or institutions answering to the religious man, another to the political man, a third to the ethical man, or a fourth to the sociable man. The method of abstracting from human nature all its propensities save one in order to get that one propensity operating, as it were, *in vacuo* received its quietus when economists gave up speculating about "the economic man."

Although there are several facets to human nature, although each aspect of social life has in some sort a psychological basis of its own, still, the deeper we penetrate into the causes of human affairs, the more impressed are we with the cross-relations between social phenomena of different orders, and the more evident is the consensus that unites facts the most diverse in character. "Every culture form," says Grosse, "is, as it were, an organism, in which all parts and functions stand in the closest interdependence." Much of our progress in the knowledge of society consists in establishing correlations, tracing subterranean actions and reactions between remote institutions. Reputations have been made by exposing the hidden link that unites slavery with cotton culture, caste with conquest, manhood suffrage with free land, the patriarchal family with pastoralism, the multiplication of wants with the rise of a leisure class.

In early philosophy each feature of social life is referred directly to human nature. The idea of auxiliary phenomenon or by-product is wanting. War is ascribed to the bad passions of men, and not to the pressure of population. Theological beliefs flow from religious intuitions. Worship arises from universal instincts. The ethical code is a deliverance of individual consciences. The actual form of the family is derived from the "natures" of men and women and children. The law objectifies the moral consciousness of mankind. In this vein Aristotle traces slavery to the natures of the born inferior and the born superior. Montesquieu makes despotism rest on fear, monarchy on honor, and a republic on virtue. Adam Smith traces the division of labor to a propensity "to truck, barter, or exchange one thing for another." Carlyle sees in dignities of rank a product of the hero-worship in human nature.

On the other hand, the more we delve beneath the surface, the more we discover sympathetic connections between things. The fuller our knowledge, the more impressed we are with the relativity of each class of social phenomena to other classes. Society no longer falls apart into neat segments like a peeled orange. State, law, religion, art, morals, industry, instead of presenting so many parallel streams of development, are studied rather as different aspects of *one social evolution*.

We see that standards of conduct are in intimate relation with beliefs, that laws are correlated with moral standards, that both reflect economic necessities, and that these, in turn, depend on the forwardness of the arts or on the relation of population to land. The state is explained, not out of human nature, but in connection with ethnic heterogeneity, militant activities, or economic inequalities. The development of religion is shown to follow step by step the development of relations within the social group. Thus a disturbance in one department of social life awakens echoes and reverberations clear around the circle. It is a perception of this truth which leads Ingram, the historian of political economy, to declare: "No rational theory of the economic organs and functions of society can be constructed if they are considered as isolated from the rest." "A separate

economic science" he deems "an impossibility as representing only one portion of a complex organism all whose parts and their actions are a constant relation of correspondence and reciprocal modification."

The antiquated systems, reasoning from metaphysical assumptions or from supposed properties of human nature, are sterile. The disciples of the abstract political economy, the unhistorical jurisprudence, the *a priori* ethics, and the speculative politics make no headway because they shut their eyes to the interdependence of dissimilar facts. In each field of social inquiry the laurels are going to those investigators who look over into other fields, who correlate the form of government with humble geographical, military, or industrial facts, religious progress with family or tribal development, moral crises with changes in consumption or in the constitution of classes.

The certainty that profounder research will reveal still closer relations of this sort is the ground of our faith in the future of sociology. We know we can afford to bide our time. We do not expect to win by preaching. In the long run the nature of things will prevail. Vested interests in learning will yield to the logic of facts. So far as social life is one, there will be one master science of social life. If not today, then tomorrow, if not by this generation, then by the next, the necessity for sociology will be fully recognized. There is a vacant chair among the great sciences, and sooner or later that chair will be filled.

Assuming the vassal and dependent character of the social sciences has been made clear beyond the shadow of a doubt, we next take up the question: "Are these sciences to become mere branches of sociology, or will they retain a measure of their old distinctness and individuality?"

It may be they will stand to sociology as the special to the general. This is how the theory of agriculture, transportation, or commerce stands to economics. Administration and comparative legislation are special in respect to political science, just as histology and embryology are special with reference to biology. Now a social science will be merely special sociology

in two cases: (1) if the phenomena it treats of flow from the same desires that cause other kinds of social phenomena, or (2) if they are produced by individual desires, special in character, but so socialized and fused that they amount to a social need and the satisfying of them amounts to the discharge of a social function. Apply now these tests to the principal social sciences.

Take the *science of religion*. Will it shrink to a mere chapter in sociology? By no means. It might if faith were nothing but an incident of speculative thought or of social discipline. If pious beliefs were an outgrowth of collective thought and never of personal experience, if in worship men sought benefits rather than obeyed impulses, we might treat religious phenomena as a mere division of social phenomena. But religion has a private as well as a public aspect. It is not all a matter of social psychology; still less is it a matter of social institution. Nor is it a side issue to something larger, a by-product of sex-feeling or conscience or economic calculation. It has a tap-root, and this tap-root is that strange invasion from the sub-conscious self which is variously known as ecstasy, rhapsody, divine afflatus, or *gnosis*. Experience of this kind generates religious convictions. The yearning to taste or renew this "communion" leads men to pious exercises. Let these individual phenomena occur on a large scale and you have cults, creeds, and churches standing out in bold relief on the face of society. The actual sweep of a religion is, of course, due in large measure to self-seeking, propitiatory motives, and to its maintenance as a prop of social order. Thereby it falls under the surveillance of the group-interest and comes to sympathize with the changes in other departments of social life. Religion is, in fact, a growth springing from the soil of human nature, but taking its shape and hue from a social medium. The science of religion is for this reason under a dual dependence, owing allegiance to psychology no less than to sociology. It is this situation Mill has in mind when he says: "The different kinds of social facts are in the main dependent, immediately and in the first resort, upon different kinds of causes, and therefore not only may with advantage, but must be, studied apart."

The relation of *ethics* to sociology bristles with difficulties. In the first place, ethics aspires not only to explain phenomena, but to appraise them. It differentiates ends. It values actions. It assumes the rôle of a normative science, whereas sociology does not venture beyond the causes and laws of the phenomena it considers. But there is an ethics that aims to understand, not to appraise, and it is this ethics alone which is on a footing with sociology.

Again, ethics may undertake to explain *actions*, or it may limit itself to those actions which affect other persons, *i.e.*, *conduct*. Usually it has ignored what are termed "indifferent actions" and addressed itself to classifying and explaining the feelings, choices, and judgments of men in respect to modes of conduct. It is, of course, only in this sense that ethics can be accounted a social science.

Now, is this "science of conduct" a semi-sovereign member of a federal empire or only a province in a unitary state? The answer depends upon the relative importance in ethical phenomena of special and general factors.

As regards *choices*, men are brought to take a socially safe line of conduct by all manner of sanctions, suggestions, standards, ideals, and valuations imposed from without. With all this social control there co-operate, however, two specific impulses—sympathy and the sense of justice. These are other-regarding, it is true, but they do not seem to have their origin in the influence of man on man. The one has its roots in instinct, the other is an off-shoot from early mental growth.

Still more marked is the private factor in the *judgments* that men in their capacity of disinterested spectators pass upon the conduct of other men. If these judgments were always grounded on social utility, if they invariably encouraged safe actions, and discouraged unsafe actions, they would amount to a self-preserving instinct in society. They would be *functional*, just as courts and reform schools are functional. Collective judgments as to good and bad would be, in effect, *institutions*—strong, upright pillars of society.

But, in point of fact, people do not praise or blame altogether

as *socii*. The moral judgments, imperatives, and ideals they emit, although in the main telic, do betray considerable admixture of crude sentiment. The general reprobation of vice, idleness, waste, sacrilege, or impiety does not voice concern for the corporate welfare. It merely voices common, private sentiments. Of some of our judgments—abhorrence of the unnatural, for instance—the roots run far down into our ancient, pre-social instincts.

At a moment when ethicists, weary of juggling conscience, innate ideas of right and wrong, the Ten Commandments, and what-not out of the individual mind, are coming to perceive the social bases of morality, one would not lay a straw in their way. Yet it is well to recognize that, after all is said, ethics is more than a mere wing of sociology. Some of the piers that support it rest in biology, some in individual psychology, some in social psychology, and some in social morphology.

Politics, like ethics, has the double task of explaining what *is* and determining what *ought to be*. In so far as it aims to arrive at principles for the guidance of political action, it is more like an *art* than a *science*, but it may be termed a normative science. Still, it is possible to regard matters of government as phenomena, and to study them with a view to ascertaining the causes and laws of their occurrence. Political science of this ætiological sort will stand in some close relation to sociology. Whether it will stand to it as part to whole or as special to general, depends, as in the preceding cases, on the specificity of the forces and facts it deals with.

Now, government is not the sphere of operation of characteristic forces, but the meeting-place of nearly all the kinds of forces present in social life. "The functions of the state," it has well been remarked, "are coextensive with human interests." This is true only because the more important human desires—greed, vanity, sympathy with the weak, love of truth, passion for homogeneity, craving for justice—make themselves felt in moulding the policy of government. One motive leads to public relief of the poor, another motive inspires state endowment of research, a third impels to the artificial assimilation of the foreign ele-

ments in the population, a fourth dictates the seizure of markets. In fact, almost every species of interest sooner or later records itself in government.

There are, to be sure, two special traits of human nature which come to light in government. The one is *the lust of dominating*; the other, its counterpart, is *the impatience of restraint*. In other words, power is sought for its own sake, and liberty is prized for its own sake. Were these two forces alone implicated in government, political science would have a basis apart from sociology. But who will seriously contend that the "will to power" is now the chief motive tending to enlarge the authority of the state, or that hatred of restraint is the chief counteracting force? In the early stages of social development a state is often the creation of a single energetic will. Says Mr. Bryce of the East: "A military adventurer or the chief of a petty tribe suddenly rises to greatness, becomes the head of an army which attacks all its neighbors, and pursues a career of unbroken conquest till he has founded a mighty empire." With greater social advance, however, there is sure to arise a compact fabric of government and law, which offers successful resistance to the vaulting ambition of the individual. As regards the antagonistic force, Mr. Bryce observes: "The abstract love of liberty has been a comparatively feeble passion." "Rebellions and revolutions are primarily made, not for the sake of freedom, but in order to get rid of some evil which touches men on a more tender place than their pride."

In fact, the political is simply imbedded in the social. Political grouping is not distinct from, but tends to be a resultant of, the linguistic, cultural, religious, and economic groupings of population. Political organization is only a part of social organization. The substance of the state is prestige, time-hallowed relations, habits of co-operation and obedience. The sphere of government becomes an expression of collective need. The will that sets in motion the public organs is not the mere sum of individual wills, but the highly elaborated will of sections, classes, or the nation itself. Government is becoming functional to society, and if political science remains distinct, it will be

because the breadth of the field calls for the specialist, and not because there are natural boundaries marking it off from sociology.

Comparative jurisprudence deals with phenomena which exhibit the working of two special principles of human nature—the *thirst for vengeance* that torments the sufferer of a wrong, and the *desire for fair play* that moves the beholders of a wrong. These formidable impulses were early led into the safe channels of legal redress, in order that society might be spared the evils of feud and retaliatory violence. In time, however, the law-originating impulses became socialized and rationalized. In-wrought with other motives, they come to express the will of the Social Personality. The just settlement of disputes, from a private need, becomes a public function. When we consider the transformation of law by jurisconsults and judges, the enlargement of it by the action of the legislator, and the renovation of it in the name of the principle of social utility, it is plain that jurisprudence cannot hope to be more than a feudatory state in the realm of sociology.

There is no reason why what is known as “the sociology of the family” together with the “population” section of political economy should not have been set apart as *genetics*. The family is certainly distinguished from other social structures by owing its existence to the highly special instincts of *sex-attraction* and *philoprogenitiveness*. These instincts, moreover, being gratified individually, do not call into being joint activities or distinct professions such as we find in the religious or economic spheres. An institution it may be, but the family is not, properly speaking, a social organ.

It is unlikely, however, that we shall see split off a science treating of the social phenomena that center in the reproductive function. One reason is that the sex and family relations, since they are always standardized in law and morals, are, at every moment, in the most intimate sympathy with the reigning culture. Furthermore, all our researches go to magnify the importance of the non-instinctive factors in fixing the duration, size, and internal structure of the family. Not long ago Maine

and Hearn and Fustel de Coulanges brought to light the religious factor. Now it is the economic factor that is exalted. As motive to marriage the attraction of the sexes is reinforced, it appears, by man's desire for a servant and woman's desire for a protector. Children are reared, not from parental love alone, but also because a daughter can be sold for cash, while the son can be kept as a helper, a protector, and an avenger. Grosse therefore hits the bull's eye when he says: "If we wish to grasp a particular social structure—say a form of family organization—in its essence and significance, we must study it in its natural connection with the civilization in which it grows, lives, and works."

As regards *noetics*, by which term we would designate the science that deals with the phenomena that arise from efforts to satisfy the craving for truth, and *æsthetics*, or the science that treats of the phenomena that arise in connection with endeavors to satisfy the craving for the beautiful, there is no doubt that, owing to their close and immediate dependence upon the psychology of the individual mind, they will retain a good deal of independence with respect to sociology. We are, in fact, coming to recognize in inventions and discoveries the first causes of many of the great transformations in society. Even in these branches of inquiry, however, new social factors are coming forward. In tracing the evolution of philosophies, sciences, and the fine arts, more causes and influences are being recognized. Attempts to resume the history of intellectual progress without taking due note of changes in the state of society have shown opinions and movements succeeding one another without meaning or logic. Those who would comprehend intellectual or æsthetic advance must consent to take into consideration such factors as the geographical environment, the prevailing occupations, the plane of comfort, town life, the influence of a leisure class, the attitude of the priesthood, the organization of education, the diffusion of learning, and the degree of honor attaching to intellectual and artistic pursuits.

The piers on which rests *economics*, the greatest of the social sciences and (save linguistics) the most independent, are certain

properties of the external world and certain properties of human nature. The latter are *the desire for wealth, the aversion to labor, and the reluctance to postpone present gratifications*. The first of these calls into being productive energies, the second and third limit this energy, the one in respect to labor, the other in respect to capital. All three co-operating distribute productive energy among places, seasons, occupations, and enterprises in a way that is termed "economic."

It would be a mistake to regard these subjective foundations of economics as simple traits of human nature. The aversion to labor has in it, indeed, an element of organic repugnance to sustained effort. But it also contains a social factor, namely a conventional disesteem of labor derived from the stigma that a leisure class attaches to the functions of the industrial class.

As to the desire for wealth, it is exceedingly complex. It has a three-fold tap-root in *hunger*, or the craving for food, *want*, or the craving for clothing and shelter, and the *love of bodily ease* which expresses itself in a demand for comfort. Its side roots, moreover, connect it with nearly all the specific desires we have considered in the foregoing pages. The passion for sex spurs a suitor to amass the riches that can win him his bride. The lust of power is a demand for the wealth that procures power. The craving for beauty is a demand for costly artistic products. The religious impulse gives off a demand for the material accessories of worship. Even the most spiritual wants demand leisure for their satisfaction, and wealth is a means to leisure. The acquisitive lust is further whetted by the honor that attaches to profuse consumption and conspicuous waste.

Thus sooner or later all the cravings of human nature put in a requisition for wealth, and the confluence of these tributaries with the main stream of desire rolls down a veritable Nile-flood of greed which beslimes, yet stimulates, nearly every profession and function in society. This generic virtue of wealth it is, which makes it stand for desirability in the abstract, and gives rise to the myth that the lust of acquisition is the sole motive of human endeavor, the direct or remote cause of all social phenomena, the single force that holds together the social frame even

as gravitation holds together the solar system. Though without reason, the economic sociologists are not without excuse.

The social economy that is sequel to the universal pursuit of gain is beautifully law-abiding, and presents a well-defined field for the science of economics. But when economics comes to treat of the consumption of wealth, it becomes vague and quickly loses itself in sociology. The reason is very simple. It is after goods have been produced and distributed that the dissimilar interests that united to spur men to acquisitive effort reappear in all their separateness. The desire for wealth splits up into its components. Most wealth-seekers follow a line of action which is termed "economic." But as wealth-consumers they behave differently. One man spends his surplus for sensual gratifications, another uses it to found a family, a third turns it into objects of beauty, a fourth makes it a votive offering, a fifth employs it to win power, a sixth makes it procure him social consideration. Its actual destination depends upon the age, the race, the stage of culture; in a word, upon *the state of society*. Its salient features—social composition, matrimonial customs, class relations, political habits—must all be taken into account in order to understand the consumption of wealth.

The relation of the trunk of a tree to its branches is, I believe, a fit symbol of the relation of Sociology to the special social sciences. But the tree in question is a banyan tree. Each of the great branches from the main trunk throws down shoots which take root and give it independent support in human nature. In the case of a branch like politics these special stems are slight and decaying. In the case of a branch like economics the direct support they yield is more important than the connection with the main trunk. In every case an independent rootage in unsocialized desire is the fact that entitles a branch of social knowledge to be termed a science, and differentiates it from those branches which, having no source of life other than the main trunk, must be termed departments of special sociology.

EDWARD ALSWORTH ROSS.

THE UNIVERSITY OF NEBRASKA.

[*To be continued.*]